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Abstract
This paper considers a distributed storage system, where multiple storage nodes can be reconstructed
simultaneously at a centralized location. This centralized multi-node repair (CMR) model is a generalization
of regenerating codes that allow for bandwidth-efficient repair of a single failed node. This work focuses on
the trade-off between the amount of data stored and repair bandwidth in this CMR model. In particular,
repair bandwidth bounds are derived for the minimum storage multi-node repair (MSMR) and the minimum
bandwidth multi-node repair (MBMR) operating points. The tightness of these bounds are analyzed via
code constructions. The MSMR point is characterized through codes achieving this point under functional
repair for general set of CMR parameters, as well as with codes enabling exact repair for certain CMR
parameters. The MBMR point, on the other hand, is characterized with exact repair codes for all CMR
parameters for systems that satisfy a certain entropy accumulation property. Finally, the model proposed
here is utilized for the secret sharing problem, where the codes for the multi-node repair problem is used
to construct communication efficient secret sharing schemes with the property of bandwidth efficient share
repair.
Index Terms
Codes for distributed storage, regenerating codes, cooperative regenerating codes, centralized multi-
node regeneration, communication efficient sercret sharing.
I. Introduction
The ability to preserve the stored information and maintain the seamless operation in the event of
permanent failures and (or) transient unavailability of the storage nodes is one of the most important issues
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2that need to be addressed while designing distributed storage systems. This gives rise to the so called ‘code
repair’ or ‘node repair’ problem which requires a storage system to enable mechanism to regenerate (repair)
the content stored on some (failed/unavailable) storage nodes with the help of the content stored on the
remaining (live/available) nodes in the system. A simple replication scheme where one stores multiple copies
of each data block on different nodes clearly enables the node repair as one can regenerate the data blocks
stored on a node by obtaining one of their copies from the other nodes in the system. However, replication
suffers from the decreasing rate as one increases the replication factor in order to enhance the resilience
of the system. This motives the use of erasure codes as they efficiently trade-off the storage space for the
ability to tolerate failure/unavailability of storage nodes. However, the better utilization of the storage space
should also be accompanied by a resource-efficient node repair process and efficiency of the node repair
becomes a yardstick for implementing one erasure code over another.
Towards this, Dimakis et al. propose repair bandwidth, the amount of data downloaded from the contacted
nodes during the repair of a single node, as a measure of the efficiency of the repair process in [1]. Considering
n storage nodes where any set of k nodes are sufficient to reconstruct the entire information, Dimakis et al.
further characterize an information-theoretic trade-off among the storage space vs. the repair bandwidth
for such codes. The codes which attain any point on this trade-off are referred to as regenerating codes.
Over the past few years, the problem of designing regenerating codes has fueled numerous research efforts
which have resulted into the constructions presented in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and the references therein.
In this paper, we explore the problem of enabling bandwidth efficient repair of multiple nodes in a
centralized manner. In particular, we consider a setting where one requires the content of any k out of n
nodes in the system to be sufficient to reconstruct the entire information (as a parameter for the worst
case fault-tolerance of the system). As for the centralized repair process, we consider a framework where
the repair of t ≥ 1 node failures is performed by contacting any d out of the n − t remaining storage
nodes. We also assume that β amount of data from each of the d contacted nodes are downloaded. We aim
to characterize the storage vs. repair-bandwidth trade-off under this centralized multi-node repair (CMR)
framework.
We believe that this framework is more suitable for the setting of large scale storage systems where there
is a need to perform repairs at a central location. Our CMR model is perhaps useful for the following
scenarios: a) Architectural and implementation related issues: Architectural constraints could make it more
efficient to regenerate the content in a centralized manner. For instance, in a rack-based node placement
architecture, a top-of-the-rack (TOR) switch failure would imply failure of nodes in the corresponding rack
to be unaccessible, and regenerating entire content of the failed rack on a per-node basis, i.e., independently
one by one, would be less efficient as compared to regenerating the content at a central location, e.g., at a
leader node in that rack. b) Threshold-based data maintenance: These schemes regenerate servers after a
threshold number of them fail. After regenerating the content stored on the failed nodes, the administrator
can recruit t newcomers as replacements of the failed nodes and re-distribute the data to the newcomers
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3in order to restore the state of the system prior to the failures. c) Availability: In the event of transient
unavailability of the t storage nodes, the centralized repair process allows the user to get access the content
stored on the unavailable nodes in a bandwidth efficient manner.
A. Related work
We note that the repair of multiple nodes in a bandwidth-efficient manner has previously been considered
under the cooperative repair model introduced in [6], [7]. There are two major differences between the
cooperative and centralized repair frameworks: a) Under cooperative repair framework [6], [7], all t newcomer
nodes are not constrained to contact the same set of d out of n−t surviving nodes. The framework allows each
newcomer to contact any d surviving nodes independent of the nodes contacted by other t− 1 newcomers.
b) Under cooperative repair framework, after downloading data from the surviving nodes, the newcomers
exchange certain amount of data among themselves. On the other hand, since a centralized entity (e.g.,
the administrator or a master server node) has access to all the downloaded information, such information
exchange is not required in the centralized repair model. Our hope is that removing the additional restriction
imposed by the cooperative repair framework will enable designing codes for a broader range of system
parameters.
The problem of centralized bandwidth-efficient repair of multiple node failures in a DSS employing has
previously been considered by Cadambe et al. [8]. However, they restrict themselves to only MDS codes and
they show existence of such codes only in the asymptotic regime where node size (amount of data stored
on a node) tends to infinity.
In addition, locality, the number of nodes contacted during repair of a single node, is another measure of
node repair efficiency which have been extensively studied in the literature [9]. Various minimum distance
bounds and constructions achieving trade-offs are presented in [9], [10], [11], [12] and the references therein.
In particular, recent works [13], [14], [15] have studied locality problem with multiple node repairs, which
is a model relevant to the framework studied in this paper.
Finally, in a recent work [16], Huang et al. proposed a model for communication efficient secret sharing,
where the system stores a secret over n nodes (shares) with the property that accessing to any z shares
does not reveal any information about the secret, and accessing to any d shares does reveal the secret.
The framework [16] is similar to that of [1] in the sense that one contacts to more than enough number of
nodes (and download a partial data from each) in order to reduce the total amount of bits downloaded (to
reveal secret in the former, and to repair a node in the latter). Given this setup, [16] provides a bound on
required amount of communication to reconstruct the secret, constructs explicit coding schemes for certain
parameter regimes achieving the stated bound, and shows an existence result for general set of parameters.
More recently, [17] focuses on the same model and proposes codes that can achieve the bound provided
in [16] for general set of parameters. A separate body of work [18], [19], [10], [20], [21], [22] considers
secure regenerating codes, where eavesdropper accessing to a subset of nodes in the system does not get
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4any information about the stored data in the system. These works essentially focus on characterizing the
maximum amount of secret bits that can be stored within a system that employs a given regenerating code
(e.g., MSR/MBR). In this sense, these works consider a storage of data that is composed of both public
(without security constraints) and private (with security constraints) information, and a data collector
connects to a predefined number of nodes to recover both types of information. Whereas, in [16], only the
reconstruction of the private information is the concern. In addition to this key difference, the eavesdropper
models in secure regenerating code papers also include eavesdroppers that can observe the data transferred
during node repairs1, whereas the framework in [16] does not consider repair problem. We note that
regenerating coding schemes which are secure against such eavesdroppers are presented in [18], [19], [10],
[20] and references therein. And, the problem of designing secure cooperative regenerating codes is explored
in [21], [22].
B. Contributions
The results of this work can be summarized as follows.
• We develop general repair bandwidth bounds for the CMR model at minimum per-node storage multi-
node repair and minimum bandwidth multi-node repair regimes, referred to as MSMR and MBMR
operating points respectively.
• We investigate tightness of the derived bounds with appropriate code constructions, and characterize the
fundamental limits of the CMR model. In particular, for the MSMR scenario, the fundamental limit is
characterized utilizing functional repair for all parameters. For special cases, explicit constructions that
achieve the stated bound are also provided. These constructions are based on cooperative regenerating
codes with minimum per-node storage (MSCR) codes as well as Zigzag codes. For the former set of
codes, we show a result that any MSCR code can be utilized as MSMR code achieving the stated
bounds. For the latter case, we show that multiple nodes can be repaired in Zigzag codes, and this
proposed repair process is bandwidth-wise optimal, achieving the derived bound in this paper.
• For the MBMR scenario, we define minimum repair bandwidth as the property of having amount
of downloaded data matching to the entropy of t nodes. For this setup, the fundamental limit is
characterized for systems having a certain entropy accumulation property. In addition, we obtain a
general mapping from minimum bandwidth cooperative regenerating (MBCR) codes to MBMR codes,
and, utilizing MBCR with a certain entropy accumulation property, we show achievability of the stated
bounds, characterizing the MBMR operating point in this special entropy accumulation case.
• Finally, we focus on the secret sharing problem, and show that the codes for the multi-node repair
problem can be transformed into communication efficient secret sharing schemes that posses not only
1This eavesdropping model is important for non-MBR codes, as for MBR codes, the amount of downloaded content for a
node repair is same as the data stored in the node.
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5the reliability (for multi-node repairs) but also the security properties. We propose a secret sharing
mechanism with repairable shares that have the highest possible repair bandwidth-efficiency in the
multi-node failure setup. Adversarial attack setup is considered to provide secrecy.
II. Centralized multi-node repair model
We introduce a new model for simultaneous repair of multiple node failures in a distributed storage
system (DSS), namely centralized multi-node repair (CMR) model. Consider an (n, k)-DSS, i.e., the system
comprises n storage nodes and the content stored on any k nodes is sufficient to reconstruct the information
stored on the system. For an (n, k)-DSS, under (d, t)-CMR model, any set of t failed nodes in the system
can be repaired by downloading data from any set of d out of n − t surviving nodes. Let α denote the
size of each node (over a finite field F) and β denote the amount of data downloaded from each of the
contacted d nodes under the (d, t)-CMR model. In order to denote all the relevant system parameters,
we also expand the notation for the CMR model as (n, k, d, t, α, γ)-CMR model or (d, t, α, γ)-CMR model.
After downloading γ = dβ symbols from the contacted nodes, the content stored on all t failed nodes is
recovered simultaneously in a centralized manner2.
III. A file size bound for the CMR model
In this section, we initiate the study of the trade-off between the per-node storage α and repair bandwidth
γ for the CMR model. We first provide a file size bound for the CMR model.
Let the system store a uniformly distributed file f of size |f | = M (over a finite field F). Consider the
case when the nodes indexed by a set K ⊆ [n] such that |K| = k are used to reconstruct the file f . Further,
assume that this set of nodes are partitioned into g number of distinct subsets Si with |Si| = ni ≤ t such
that
g∑
i=1
ni = k. We have the following bound.
Lemma 1. The system parameters necessarily satisfy
M≤
g∑
i=1
min
{
niα,
(
d−
i−1∑
j=1
nj
)
β
}
. (1)
Proof: Denoting the symbols stored on the nodes indexed by the set S by xS , we have
M = H(f) (a)= H(f)−H(f |xK) = I(xK; f) ≤ H(xK) (2)
(b)
=
g∑
i=1
H(xSi |xS1:Si−1) (3)
(c)
≤
g∑
i=1
min
H(xSi), (d−
i−1∑
j=1
nj
)
β
 (4)
2The CMR model also allow for the distributed/parallel repair of all the t failed nodes by t newcomers independently.
However, it is assumed that each of the t newcomers have an access to all the γ downloaded symbols.
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6(d)
≤
g∑
i=1
min
niα, (d−
i−1∑
j=1
nj
)
β
 , (5)
where (a) is due to recoverability constraint H(f |xK) = 0 as |K| = k, (b) is due to K = ∪gi=1Si, (c) & (d)
are due to the following bounds for each term in the sum: H(xSi |xS1:Si−1) ≤ H(xSi) ≤ niα, and
H(xSi |xS1:Si−1)
(e)
= H(xSi |xS1:Si−1)
−H(xSi |xS1:Si−1 ,dHi−S1:Si−1)
= I(dHi−S1:Si−1 ;xSi |xS1:Si−1)
≤ H(dHi−S1:Si−1) ≤
d− i−1∑
j=1
nj
β
where set of helper nodes to regenerate symbols in Si is denoted as Hi, this set of d nodes is constructed by
using the sets S1 · · · Si−1 and additional nodes not belonging to these sets (this is possible as
g∑
i=1
ni = k ≤ d),
downloaded symbols from these additional nodes are denoted as dHi−S1:Si−1 with |Hi−S1 : Si−1| = d−
i−1∑
j
nj ,
and (e) follows as H(xSi |xS1:Si−1 ,dHi−S1:i−1) = 0 as H(xS |dH)=0 for any S such that |S| ≤ t and any H
such that |H| = d.
Given the bound in Proposition 1, we differentiate between two operating regimes of the system: Minimum
storage multi-node regeneration (MSMR) and minimum bandwidth multi-node regeneration (MBMR). The
MSMR point corresponds to having an MDS code which requires that α =M/k. Codes that attain minimum
possible repair bandwidth under this constraint, i.e., α = M/k, are referred to as MSMR codes. On the
other hand, the MBMR point restricts that H(xS) = γ = dβ for every S ⊆ [n] such that |S| = t, i.e.,
the amount of data downloaded during the centralized repair of t node failures is equal to the amount of
information stored on the lost t nodes. MBMR codes achieve the minimum possible repair bandwidth under
this restriction, i.e., H(xS) = γ = dβ. In the following, we focus on the problem of characterizing these two
operating points of the CMR model.
IV. MSMR Codes
We first utilize Lemma 1 to obtain a bound on the repair bandwidth at the MSMR point, and then focus
on achievability.
A. Repair bandwidth bound
Proposition 1. Consider an (n, k)-DSS that stores a file of sizeM and enables repair of t failed nodes under
a (d, t, αMSMR =
M
k , γ)-CMR model. Then, we have
γMSMR ≥ Mdt
k(d− k + t) . (6)
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7Proof: Let a = bk/tc and b = k − at. We set n1 = b and ni = t for i = 2, · · · , g = a + 1. From the
bound (1), we obtain
M≤ min {bα, dβ}+
a∑
i=1
min {tα, [d− (i− 1)t− b]β} . (7)
Note that we have α = Mk which implies that dβ ≥ bα and
[d− (i− 1)t− b]β ≥ tα,∀i = 1, · · · , a,
From this, we obtain β ≥ bαd and [d− (a− 1)t− b]β ≥ tα, i.e., β ≥ tα[d−at−b+t] = tα[d−k+t] . This implies that
γMSMR = dβ ≥ dαmax
{
t
d− k + t ,
b
d
}
(i)
=
Mdt
k(d− k + t) ,
where (i) follows from the fact that we have b < t ≤ k and α = Mk .
Remark 1. Note that the same bound is also obtained by Cadambe et al. in [8] where they consider repair
of multiple failures in an MDS code.
Remark 2. A code that allows for repair of t failed nodes with the parameters
(
d, t, α = Mk , γ =
Mdt
k(d−k+t)
)
-
CMR is an MSMR code.
Proposition 2. The bound above (6) does not improve when helper nodes are allowed to contribute different
amounts of data for regeneration of t nodes.
Proof: The proof follows from the steps given in [16]. Assume that the n nodes in the DSS are indexed
by the set [n]. Let’s consider a specific failure pattern, where the t nodes indexed by the set [t] ⊂ [n] are
under failure. Furthermore, we assume that the d nodes indexed by the set {t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t + d} are
contacted to repair the t failures under the centralized repair model. For j ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , t+ d}, let sj
denote the symbols downloaded from the node indexed by j in order to repair the t failed nodes. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that3
|st+1| ≥ |st+2| ≥ · · · ≥ |st+d|. (8)
Note that an (n, k)-coding scheme with α = Mk is an MDS coding scheme. Therefore, the content of the
nodes indexed by the set {t + 1, . . . , k} does not provide any information about the content of the failed
nodes, i.e., the nodes indexed by the set [t]. Therefore, in order to be able to repair the t failed nodes, we
need to have
t+d∑
j=t+k+1
|si| ≥ tα, (9)
3Note that the proof holds even when we define βt =
γt
d
=
∑t+d
j=t+1 |sj |
d
, i.e., βt represents the average number of symbols
downloaded from each of the contacted nodes. In the special setting where we have each contacted node contributes the equal
number of symbols during the centralized node repair process, we have βt = |st+1| = · · · = |st+d|.
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81 2 3 4 5 6
x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,0 + x0,1 + x0,2 x0,0 + x6,1 + x2,2 x0,0 + x3,1 + x1,2
x1,0 x1,1 x1,2 x1,0 + x1,1 + x1,2 x1,0 + x7,1 + x0,2 x1,0 + x4,1 + x2,2
x2,0 x2,1 x2,2 x2,0 + x2,1 + x2,2 x2,0 + x8,1 + x1,2 x2,0 + x5,1 + x0,2
x3,0 x3,1 x3,2 x3,0 + x3,1 + x3,2 x3,0 + x0,1 + x5,2 x3,0 + x6,1 + x4,2
x4,0 x4,1 x4,2 x4,0 + x4,1 + x4,2 x4,0 + x1,1 + x3,2 x4,0 + x7,1 + x5,2
x5,0 x5,1 x5,2 x5,0 + x5,1 + x5,2 x5,0 + x2,1 + x4,2 x5,0 + x8,1 + x3,2
x6,0 x6,1 x6,2 x6,0 + x6,1 + x6,2 x6,0 + x3,1 + x8,2 x6,0 + x0,1 + x7,2
x7,0 x7,1 x7,2 x7,0 + x7,1 + x7,2 x7,0 + x4,1 + x6,2 x7,0 + x1,1 + x8,2
x8,0 x8,1 x8,2 x8,0 + x8,1 + x8,2 x8,0 + x5,1 + x7,2 x8,0 + x2,1 + x6,2
Fig. 1: Repair of the first two systematic nodes in a (6, 3)-zigzag code. (Coding coefficients of the parity
symbols are not specified.) Blue (red) colored symbols contribute in the repair of only node 1 (respectively,
2) in the case of single node failure. Green colored symbols contribute in the repair of both node 1 and
node 2 in the case of single node failure. Magenta colored symbols denote the additional symbols that need
to be downloaded to enable the centralized repair of both the nodes.
i.e., the amount of data downloaded from the remaining d + t − k contacted nodes should be at least the
amount of information lost due to node failures. Therefore, we have
γt =
t+k∑
j=t+d
|sj |
(a)
≥ d
d− k + t
t+d∑
j=t+k+1
|sj |
(b)
≥ dtα
d− k + t , (10)
where (a) and (b) follow from (8) and (9), respectively.
B. Constructions and the characterization of the MSMR point
1) Constructions from existing MSCR codes: Minimum storage cooperative regenerating (MSCR) codes
allow for simultaneous repair of t storage nodes with the following scheme: Each newcomer node contacts
to d nodes and downloads β symbols from each. (Different nodes can contact to different live nodes.) Then,
each newcomer node sends β′ symbols to each other. Under this setup, the repair bandwidth per failed
node is dβ + (t− 1)β′. MSCR codes operate at αMSCR =M/k and βMSCR = β′MSCR = Mk(d−k+t) .
Proposition 3. A code C that operates as an MSCR code is also an MSMR code for the CMR model.
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9Proof: Consider that each failed node contact to the same set of d nodes in the MSCR code C. Then,
each failed node downloads βMSCR symbols from these d helper nodes, resulting in a total of at most
γ = tdβMSCR =
Mdt
k(d−k+t) symbols. These symbols can recover each failed node, hence regenerates t failed
nodes in the CMR model. Therefore, code C is an MSMR code with α = Mk and γ = Mdtk(d−k+t) .
We remark that random linear network coding attains MSCR point [6], hence it provides an MSMR code
with functional repair. Explicit code constructions for the MSCR setup while ensuring exact-repair, on the
other hand, are know for a small set of parameters. The only such constructions that we are aware of are
provided in [23] for k = t = 2, in [24] for t = 2 (for parameters (n, k, d) at which (n, k, d + 1) MSR codes
exist), and in [6] for d = k. We believe that moving from the cooperative repair model [6], [7] to the CMR
model would allow us to construct MDS codes (MSMR codes) that enable repair-bandwidth efficient repair
of t nodes for an expanded set of system parameters. We exhibit this by designing a scheme to perform
centralized repair of multiple nodes in a distributed storage system employing a zigzag code [3].
2) Centralized repair of multiple node failures in a zigzag code [3]: The zigzag codes, as introduced in
[3], are MDS codes that allow for repair of a single node failure among systematic nodes by contacting
d = n− 1 (all of the) remaining nodes. The zigzag codes are associated with the MSR point [1] (or MSMR
point with t = 1 (cf. (6))) as each of the contacted d = n− 1 nodes contributes β = αd−k+1 = αn−k symbols
during the repair of a single failed node. This amounts to the repair bandwidth of γ = dβ = n−1n−kα. Here,
we show that the framework of zigzag codes also enable repair of multiple nodes in the CMR model.
We state the achievable parameters in the following result. We then illustrate the proposed centralized
repair scheme with the help an example of an (n = 6, k = 3)-zigzag code where we can simultaneously
repair any 2 systematic nodes4.
Theorem 1. For an (n = k + r, k) zigzag code with r = n − k ≥ 2, it is possible to repair any 1 ≤ t ≤ 3
systematic nodes in a centralized manner with the optimal repair-bandwidth (cf. 6) by contacting d = n− t
helper nodes.
Proof: We provide the details of the repair process for 2 ≤ t ≤ 3 systematic nodes along with the
necessary background on zigzag codes in Appendix A.
Example 1 (Repairing t = 2 systematic nodes in a (6, 3)-zigzag code). Let’s consider a zigzag code with
the parameters n = 6, k = 3 and α = 9 from [3]. This code is illustrated in Table 1 where each column
(indexed from 1 to 6) represents a storage node. Recall that, in the event of a single node failure, this code
allows for the repair of any systematic node failure by contacting dˆ = 5 remaining nodes and downloading
β = αn−k = 3 symbols from each of these nodes. We now show that we can use this same construction (with
required modifications of the non-zero coefficients in coded symbols) to repair 2 systematic node failures
4In a parallel and independent work [25], the authors present a mechanism for repairing multiple failures in zigzag codes as
well. They show that the zigzag codes can repair any t ≤ n− k failures while achieving the lower bound in (6).
March 16, 2016 DRAFT
10
by contacting d = n− 2 = 4 remaining nodes. We download t α
d̂−k+2 = 2
α
n−k = 6 symbols from each of the
d = 4 contacted nodes.
Assume that node 1 and 2 are in failure. We download the colored symbols from node 3 to node 6 in
Figure 1 to repair these two nodes. Using the downloaded symbols, we get the following 18 combinations
in the 18 unknown information symbols. (We suppress the coefficients of the linear combinations here.)
x0,0 + x6,1, x1,0 + x4,1, x2,0 + x2,1, x3,0 + x0,1,
x4,0 + x7,1, x5,0 + x5,1, x6,0 + x0,1, x7,0 + x7,1,
x8,0 + x5,1, x2,0 + x8,1, x1,0 + x7,1, x6,0 + x6,1,
x2,0 + x5,1, x7,0 + x4,1, x0,0 + x3,1, x8,0 + x2,1,
x1,0 + x1,1, x0,0 + x0,1. (11)
Now, we need to show that it is possible to choose the coding coefficients in such a manner that these
18 equations allow us to recover the desired 18 symbols. Assuming that A denotes the 18 × 18 coefficient
matrix of the aforementioned 18 combinations, it is a necessary and sufficient (with large enough field size)
condition for the matrix A to be full rank that the natural bipartite graph associated with the matrix A
contains a perfect matching5 [26], [27]. We illustrate one such perfect matching in (11), where the colored
unknown symbol in a combination represents the unknown symbol matched by that combination. The
similar argument can be performed for the remaining combinations of 2 failed systematic nodes.
3) MSMR point: The achievability results above together with the repair bandwidth bound reported in
the previous section, see Remark 2, results in the following characterization.
Theorem 2. The MSMR point for the (n, k, d, t, α, γ)-CMR model is given by
αMSMR =
M
k
, γMSMR =
Mdt
k(d− k + t) .
V. MBMR Codes
In this section, we focus on the other extremal point of the storage vs. repair-bandwidth trade-off, namely
the MBMR point.
A. Repair bandwidth bound
For the MBMR point, depending on whether t|k or t - k, we state the following two results.
Proposition 4. Assume that t|k. Consider an (n, k)-DSS that stores a file of size M and enables repair of
t failed nodes under a (d, t, αMBMR, γMBMR)-CMR model. Then, denoting the entropy of t nodes as Ht,
5The left and the right nodes in the bipartite graph correspond to the combinations and the unknowns, respectively.
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we have
tαMBMR ≥ Ht = γMBMR, (12)
γMBMR ≥ M2dt
k(2d− k + t) . (13)
Proof: Note that the MBMR point has H(xS) = γMBMR for every S ⊆ [n] such that |S| = t. Therefore,
we have
γMBMR = H(xS) ≤
∑
i∈S
H(xi) ≤ tαMBMR.
In order to establish the lower bound on γMBMR in (13), we use ni = t,∀i ∈ [a] in the bound (1), we obtain
M≤
k/t∑
i=1
(
d− (i− 1)t)β = k
t
(
2d− k + t
2
)
β. (14)
This implies that γMBMR = dβ ≥ M2dtk(2d−k+t) .
Proposition 5. Consider an (n, k)-DSS that stores a file of sizeM and enables repair of t failed nodes under
a (d, t, αMBMR, γMBMR)-CMR model. Then, the bounds given in (12) and (13) hold for the case of t - k,
if Hb ≥
(
β
t
) [
b
(
2d+t−1
2
)− (b2)], where b = k (mod t), and Hb denotes entropy of b nodes in the system.
Proof: The bound in (12) follows from the similar analysis as presented in the proof of Proposition 5.
In order to establish (13), we select g = bk/tc + 1 = a + 1 disjoint sets of nodes indexed by the sets
S1,S2, . . . ,Sg such that n1 = |S1| = b and ni = |Si| = t for i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , g = a + 1}. Note that we have∑
i ni = k. Utilizing this particular sequence of sets in (4) along with the fact that we have H(xSi) = dβ
for 2 ≤ i ≤ g, we obtain
M≤ min{H(xS1), dβ}+ a∑
i=1
(
d− (i− 1)t− b)β
= H(xS1) +
a∑
i=1
(
d− (i− 1)t− b)β. (15)
Note that the choice of the set S1 is arbitrary and all the nodes in the system are equivalent in terms of
their information content. Therefore, Hb = H(S1) (the amount of information stored on b nodes indexed
by the set S1) only depends on b. It follows from (15) that
M≤ Hb +
(
2d− k + (t− b)
2
)
aβ (16)
In order to have the bound in (13) we need the RHS of (16) to be at least the RHS of (14), i.e.,
Hb +
(
2d− k + (t− b)
2
)
aβ ≥ k
t
(
2d− k + t
2
)
β.
This implies that
Hb ≥
(
2d− k + t
2
)
k
t
β −
(
2d− k + (t− b)
2
)
aβ
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=
(
β
t
)[
b
(
2d+ t− 1
2
)
−
(
b
2
)]
. (17)
Remark 3. A code that allows for repair of t failed nodes with Ht = γ =
M2dt
k(2d−k+t) is an MBMR code for
the case of t|k and t - k, if for the latter case the system also operates at Hb ≥
(
β
t
) [
b
(
2d+t−1
2
)− (b2)].
B. Constructions and the characterization of the MBMR point
1) Constructions from existing MBCR codes: MBCR codes have αMBCR =
M
k
2d+t−1
2d+t−k , β =
M
k
2
2d+t−k ,
and β′ = Mk
1
2d+t−k . A construction of MBCR codes for all parameters is provided in [28], where the
entropy accumulation for MBCR codes is also characterized. In particular, entropy of b ≤ k nodes is given
by Hb =
(
b
(
2d+t−1
2
)− (b2))β.
Proposition 6. A code C that operates as an MBCR code is also an MBMR code for the CMR model that
operates at α = M(2d+t−1)k(2d+t−k) and Hb ≥
(
β
t
) [
b
(
2d+t−1
2
)− (b2)].
Proof: Consider that each failed node contact to the same set of d nodes in the MBCR code C. This
results in a repair bandwidth of at most γ = tdβMBCR =
M2dt
k(2d+t−k) . Entropy of t nodes in this code is
given by Ht =
(
t
(
2d+t−1
2
)− (t2)) Mk 22d+t−k = M2dtk(2d+t−k) = γ. These and also the entropy of b nodes meet
the conditions stated in Remark 3, establishing the claimed result.
Remark 4. In general, for MBMR codes, we have the condition that tα ≥ Ht = γMBMR. It is not clear if
α can be further reduced than that in Proposition 6, e.g., when b = 0.
2) MBMR point: The achievability results above together with the repair bandwidth bound reported in
the previous section results in the following characterization.
Theorem 3. Let k (mod t) = b. Then, for the CMR models satisfying Hb ≥
(
β
t
) [
b
(
2d+t−1
2
)− (b2)], the
MBMR point is given by
Ht = γMBMR =
M2dt
k(2d+ t− k) .
VI. Applications to communication and repair efficient secret sharing schemes
Recently, in [16], Huang et al. proposed a model for communication efficient secret sharing. They consider
a setting where one wants to encode a secret m ∈ FKQ into N shares s1, s2, . . . , sN ∈ FQ. The encoding
from secret to shares should satisfy two requirements: 1) Given any z shares one should not be able to
learn any information about the secret m and 2) given access to any d ≥ N − r shares one should be
able to reconstruct (or decode) the entire secret m. Huang et al. refer to such secret sharing schemes as
(N,K, r, z)Q secret sharing schemes. For a naive secret reconstruction process, one downloads Q symbols
over FQ from each of the d contacted shares leading to the communication bandwidth (the amount of data
downloaded for secret reconstruction) of dQ symbols over FQ. In [16], Huang et al. explore the minimum
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possible communication bandwidth of an (N,K, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme as a function of the number
of shares participating in the reconstruction process d. Towards this end, the authors obtain the following
bound on the communication bandwidth of an (N,K, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme when N − r ≤ d ≤ N
shares are available during the reconstruction process6.
BWd ≥ d
d− zK, (18)
where the communication bandwidth is counted in terms of the number of symbols over FQ. Huang et al.
further present an explicit (N,K = N − r − z, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme which attain the bound in (18)
for d = k and d = N . They also show the existence of (N,K = N−r−z, r, z)Q secret sharing schemes which
attain the lower bound on the communication bandwidth for all values of d in {N − r,N − r + 1, . . . , N}.
Note that these secret sharing schemes are designed to work for a particular value d. However, it is also an
interesting question to design secret sharing schemes which simultaneously work for all the values of d. In
[17], Bitar and El Rouayheb present two explicit constructions which give (N,K = N − r − z, r, z)Q secret
sharing schemes with optimal communication bandwidth. The first construction attains the bound in (18)
for any fixed d and the second construction simultaneously attains the bound for N − r ≤ d ≤ N .
In this section, we show that the communication optimal (N,K, r, z)Q secret sharing schemes can be
designed using the codes which allow for centralized repair of multiple nodes. The added advantage of using
this approach to construct secret sharing scheme is that this method also enables bandwidth efficient repair
of shares in the secret sharing scheme. This can also be viewed as an attempt to unify the study of repair
bandwidth efficient codes for distributed storage and communication efficient efficient secret sharing. This
allows us to employ various ideas from the work on secure distributed storage literature to the setting of
communication efficient secret sharing.
Let Ms be the size of the secret m (over Fq) that we want secure in the secret sharing scheme. We
further assume that each of the N shares in the secret sharing scheme consists of α symbols over Fq, i.e.,
we have FQ = Fqα . Note that Huang et al. define the sizes of the secret and the shares over the same
alphabet FQ = Fqα [16]. However, we denote the size of the secret over a base field Fq and assume that
each share comprises a symbol from the extension field FQ = Fqα . This representation is quite prevalent
in the distributed storage literature and is consistent with the rest of the paper as well. We represent the
secret sharing scheme as an (N,Ms, r, z)α,q or (N,Ms, r, z)α secret sharing scheme. First, we restate the
lower bound on the communication bandwidth of an (N,Ms, r, z)α secret sharing schemes (cf. (18)) in our
notations as follows.
BWd ≥ d
d− zM
s, (19)
where we count the communication bandwidth BWd in terms of number of symbols over the base field Fq.
6In [16], the authors present this bound in terms of communication overhead COd which is the difference between the
communication bandwidth BWd and the size of the secret K.
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Definition 1. (z-secure distributed storage system) Consider an (n, k)-DSS storing a file fs of size Ms (over
Fq) under the (d, t)-CMR model. We say that the DSS is z-secure if an eavesdropper who has access to the
content of any set of z (out of n) storage nodes does not gain any information about the file fs.
Remark 5. Recall that when there is no security requirement, we denote the file stored on the DSS and its
size as f and M (over Fq), respectively (cf. Section III). The quantity M−Ms denotes the loss in the file
size that the system has to bear in order to guarantee the information theoretic security of the stored file
against an eavesdropper. Or, this part of the data can be considered as public information (without any
secrecy constraints), as compared to the private counterpart (which has secrecy constraints).
The file size bounds for DSS which are secure against even a general eavesdropping model where an
eavesdropper can observe both the content stored on a set of nodes and the content downloaded during
the repair of another set of node have been previously considered in the literature. The regenerating coding
schemes which are secure against such eavesdroppers are presented in [18], [19], [10], [20] and references
therein. Similarly, the problem of designing secure cooperative regenerating codes is explored in [21], [22].
As discussed in Section IV and V, both regenerating codes and cooperative regenerating codes are specific
sub-classes of codes for centralized repair model. Therefore, both the secure regenerating codes and secure
cooperative regenerating codes which can prevent the leakage of information to an eavesdropper observing
the content stored on z-storage nodes form special cases of z-secure DSS under CMR model with respective
system parameters.
We can utilize z-secure coding scheme for DSS under the CMR model to obtain communication efficient
secret sharing schemes. We first illustrate this approach with the help of a secure MSR code in the following
subsection. We then comment on how this approach can be employed using general secure coding schemes
for DSS under the CMR model.
A. An example
Let C be a linear systematic code which operates at (n,M, d < n − 1, α = Mz+1 , β = αd−(z+1)+1 )q MSR
point. Note that this C is also an MDS code where the content of any k = z + 1 symbols is sufficient to
recover the entire file of size M. We next show how we can use C to construct a communication bandwidth
efficient (N = n− 1,Ms = α = Mz+1 , r = N − z − 1, z)α secret sharing scheme.
Let m = (m1, . . . ,mα) ∈ Fαq denote the secret of size α over Fq. Let r = (r1, r2, . . . , rzα) ∈ Fzαq be zα
random symbols which are distributed uniformly at random over Fq. We encode the M = (z + 1)α-length
vector (m, r) ∈ FMq using the MSR code C. Let (c1, c2, . . . , cn) = (m, r, cz+2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fnqα denote the
associated MSR codeword. Note that a code symbol, say ci, can be repaired by any set of d out of the
remaining n− 1 code symbols by downloading at most dβ = dd−(z+1)+1α = dd−zMs symbols (over Fq) from
the contacted d nodes. In order to obtain a secret sharing scheme we puncture the symbol c1 from each of
the codewords in C which gives us another code C˜ ∈ Fn−1qα . Let c˜ = (c2, c3, . . . , cn) ∈ Fn−1qα be the codeword
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in C˜ which is obtained by removing the first code symbol from the codeword c ∈ C. For the secret m we
treat n−1 symbols in c˜ as N = n−1 shares of the secret sharing scheme. In order to reconstruct the secret
m, we can invoke the node repair process of first node (code symbol) in the original MSR code C where we
contact d shares and download β = αd−k+1 from each of these d shares. This leads to the communication
bandwidth of
dβ =
d
d− zM
s,
which matches the bound in (19). Using the MDS property 7 of C˜, it is easy to argue that C is a z-secure
coding scheme. Note that besides reconstructing the secret m in a communication efficient manner, the
proposed scheme also allows the bandwidth efficient repair of any of the N = n− 1 shares by using d out
of N − 1 = n− 2 remaining shares. This can be performed again by invoking the repair mechanism of the
original MSR code C.
m c2 c3 cn
c2 c3 cn
Fig. 2: Message puncturing from an MSR code gives communication efficient secret sharing with repairable
shares.
B. Construction of communication and repair efficient secret sharing schemes using MSMR codes
Generally, we can utilize an MSMR code to obtain a communication efficient secret sharing scheme
which also enables bandwidth efficient repair of the shares in the scheme. Let C be a systematic linear
(n, k = z+ t, d, t, α = Mk , γ =
tM
k
d
d−k+t )q-MSMR code. Recall that this code encodes a file f of size M over
Fq to an n-length codeword c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fnqα such that we have
ci = (f(i−1)α+1, f(i−1)α+2, . . . , fiα) ∈ Fαq for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Using the code C, we now construct a communication efficient (N = n− t,Ms = tα = tMz+t , r = N − z− t =
n − k − t, z)α secret sharing scheme. Let m ∈ FMsq = Ftαq denote the secret to be encoded. Let r =
(r1, r2, . . . , rzα) ∈ Fzαq be zα independent random symbols which are distributed uniformly at random over
Fq. We encode the M = (z+ t)α symbols long file f = (m, r) ∈ F(z+t)αq using the MSMR code C. Given c =
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fnqα , the codeword associated with the file f in the MSMR code C, we puncture the codeword
7Since C is an (n, z + 1) MDS code, it is straightforward to observe that C˜ is an (n− 1, z + 1) MDS code.
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at the first t code symbols to obtain a punctured codeword c˜ = (c˜1, c˜2, . . . , c˜N ) = (ct+1, ct+2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fn−tqα .
Assuming that C˜ denotes the codebook obtained by puncturing all the codewords in C at the first t code
symbols, we have c˜ ∈ C˜. We claim that C˜ gives us a (N = n − t,Ms = tα = tMz+t , r = N − z = n − k, z)α
secret sharing scheme.
m1 m2 mt ct+1 ct+2 cn
ct+1 ct+2 cn
Fig. 3: Puncturing of the secret covering multiple symbols in an MSMR code gives communication efficient
secret sharing with multi-share repair property.
• Security: Let’s consider an adversary who has access to z shares c˜i1 , c˜i2 , . . . , c˜iz . We make two
observations: First, we have H(c˜i1 , c˜i2 , . . . , c˜iz ) ≤ zα = H(r). Second, given m and c˜i1 , c˜i2 , . . . , c˜iz
we have access to k = z + t code symbols of c ∈ C; as a result, we can decode r (by decoding
f = (m, r)) as C is an (n, k = z + t) MDS code. From these two observations, it follows that the
adversary does not get any information about the secret m from the z shares at its disposal [19], [10].
• Communication efficiency: Assume that we contact a set of d shares c˜i1 , c˜i2 , . . . , c˜id . Since these d shares
form d code symbols in the codeword c of the MSMR code, we can use these d shares to recover the
secret m which constitutes the first t code symbols of the code word c. Recall that we download total
γ = tMz+t
d
d−(z+t)+t =
d
d−zMs symbols (over Fq) from the d shares we contact. Note that γ is exactly
equal to the lower bound on (19) which establishes the communication efficiency of the obtained secret
sharing scheme.
Remark 6. Note that if we have d < N − t, by invoking the repair process of the original MSMR code
C, we can repair any t shares by contacting any set of d out of N − t remaining shares and downloading
γ = dd−zMs symbols from the contacted shares. We are not necessarily required to repair the shares in
the group of t failed shares at a time. If the original MSMR coding scheme also allows for bandwidth
efficient repair of less than t code symbols (nodes) at a time, then we can also repair less than t failed
shares at a time by using such repair mechanism. Specifically, in Section IV-B1 and IV-B2, we discuss some
constructions of MSMR codes that are obtained from MSR codes. Therefore, the secret sharing schemes
designed by these codes enable bandwidth efficient repair of one share at a time as well.
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C. Secret sharing schemes using MBMR codes
In this subsection, we illustrate how coding schemes at the MSMR point can be utilized to construct
communication and repair efficient secret sharing scheme. Note that this allows us to increase the size of the
share in an MDS code in order to lower the repair bandwidth. Furthermore, this also allows us to construct
explicit secret sharing schemes for a wider set of parameters n, k, d, and α. Here we note that the MBMR
coding scheme that we employ in this subsection is from [28]. We define the following quantities.
M = k(2d+ t− k) = (z + t)(2d+ t− (z + t)) = (z + t)(2d− z) (20)
Ms = t(2d+ t− k − z) = t(2d+ t− (z + t)− z) = 2t(d− z). (21)
Given n, k = z + t and d, we construct an MBMR code as follows.
• Let {y1, y2, . . . , yn+d+t−1} ⊆ Fq be n + d + t − 1 distinct elements in Fq. Similarly, we select another
set of n+ d− 1 distinct elements in Fq as {x1, x2, . . . , xn+d−1} ⊆ Fq.
• Given an M-length message vector f = (f1, f2, . . . , fM) ∈ FMq construct a bi-variate polynomial such
that
F (X,Y ) =
∑
0≤i<k,
0≤j<k
ai,jX
iY j +
∑
0≤i<k,
k≤j<d+t
bi,jX
iY j +
∑
k≤i<d,
0≤j<k
ci,jX
iY j . (22)
Here,
(a0,1, a0,2, . . . , ak−1,k−1, b0,k, b1,k, . . . , bk−1,d+t−1, ck,0, ck,1, . . . , cd−1,k−1) = Af (23)
for an M×M matrix A with entries from Fq which we specify later.
• Given the polynomial F (X,Y ), the ith code symbol ci of the codeword associated with f in C is
obtained by evaluating F (X,Y ) at
{(xi, yi), (xi, yi+1), . . . , (xi, yi+d+t−1), (xi+1, yi), (xi+2, yi), . . . , (xi+d−1, yi)}.
That is, we have
ci =
(
F (xi, yi), F (xi, yi+1), . . . , F (xi, yi+d+t−1), F (xi+1, yi), F (xi+2, yi), . . . , F (xi+d−1, yi)
) ∈ F2d+t−1q .
Remark 7. Note that the code symbol ci contains d + t evaluations of the degree-(d + t) polynomial
hi(Y ) = F (xi, Y ) at distinct points {yi, yi+1, . . . , yi+d+t−1}. Therefore, the content of ci is sufficient to
recover the polynomial hi(Y ) = F (xi, Y ). Similarly, ci contains d evaluations of the degree-d polynomial
gi(X) = F (X, yi) at distinct points {xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+d−1}. This implies that the content of ci is sufficient
to recover the polynomial gi(X) = F (X, yi).
Remark 8. In [28], Wang and Zhang show that this construction enables repair of any t code symbols
(nodes) under a cooperative repair framework. This implies that the coding scheme can also be utilized in
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the centralized repair framework. As discussed in Section V-B, these codes operate at the MBMR point
with α = 2d+ t− 1 and the repair bandwidth
γt =
M2dt
k(2d+ t− k) =
M2dt
(z + t)(2d− z) . (24)
The codeword associated with the information symbols f in C is described in Figure 4. Note that the
content of evaluations highlighted in Figure 4 form an information set as the originalM information symbols
f can be reconstructed from the highlighted symbols [28]. Therefore, it is possible to precode the information
symbols f using an M×M matrix A (cf. (23)) such that the information symbols themselves appear at
the highlighted positions in the codewords of C. Note that this corresponds to a systematic encoding for
the code C.
We now describe how we can utlize the MBMR code described above to obtain a a communication efficient
(N = n− t,Ms, d, r = N − z − t = n− z − 2t, z)α,q-secret sharing scheme. Let m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mMs) ∈
FMsq be a Ms-length (over Fq) secret that needs to be encoded in the secret sharing scheme. Let r =
(r1, r2, . . . , rR) ∈ FRq be R = M −Ms = 2dz + zt − z2 i.i.d. random variables which are uniformly
distributed over Fq. Given the Ms-length secret m, the (M −Ms)-length random symbols r and the
precoding matrix A, we construct the M-length information vector 8 f such that the secret m appears
in the code symbols cz+1, . . . , cz+t as described in Figure 4. In other words, there exists a permutation
σ : [Ms]→ [Ms] such that we have
F (xz+1, yz+1) = mσ(1), F (xz+1, yz+2) = mσ(2), . . . , F (xz+1, yz+d+t−1) = mσ(d+t),
...
F (xz+t, yz+1) = mσ((t−1)(d+t)+1), F (xz+t, yz+2) = mσ((t−1)(d+t)+2), . . . , F (xz+t, yz+d+t−1) = mσ(t(d+t))
F (xz+t+1, yz+1) = mσ(t(d+t)+1), F (xz+t+1, yz+2) = mσ(t(d+t)+2), . . . , F (xz+t+1, yz+t) = mσ(t(d+t)+t),
...
F (xd, yz+1) = mσ((t−1)(d+t)+1), F (xd, yz+2) = mσ((t−1)(d+t)+2), . . . , F (xd, yz+t) = mσ(Ms), (25)
where we have used the fact that Ms = 2t(d − z) in the last equality. Now, the encoding of the secret
m in the secret sharing scheme C˜ is obtained by puncturing the code symbols cz+1, cz+2, . . . , cz+t for the
codeword c ∈ C (cf. Figure 5). Thus, the N = n− t shares associated with the secret m in the secret sharing
scheme C˜ are defined as
c˜ = (c˜1, c˜2, . . . , c˜N ) = (c1, . . . , cz, cz+t+1, . . . , cn) ∈ FNqα . (26)
We now argue the security and the communication efficiency of the proposed secret sharing scheme.
8Each of the M symbols in the vector f comprises either a symbol from m or r. Moreover, each symbol of m and r appears
in exactly one coordinate of the vector f .
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Fig. 4: Description of the MBMR coding scheme with a particular systematic encoding utilized in this paper.
Each node (code symbol) is collection of d+ t and d evaluations of the univariate polynomials {hi(Y )} and
{gi(X)}, respectively. Note that the systematic encoding ensures that the random symbols r and the secret
symbols m appear in the first z and the subsequent t code symbols, respectively.
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Fig. 5: Puncturing of the secret covering multiple symbols in the MBMR code gives communication efficient
secret sharing with multi-share repair property.
• Security: Assume that an adversary has access to z shares c˜i1 , c˜i2 , . . . , c˜iz . Let these shares correspond to
the code symbols cj1 , cj2 , . . . , cjz in the associated codeword in the MBMR code C with {j1, j2, . . . , js} ⊂
[n]\{z + 1, . . . , z + t}. It follows from the Remark 7 that the adversary knows the following univariate
polynomials9.
{
hjs(Y ) = F (xjs , Y ), gjs(X) = F (X, yjs)
}
for s = 1, 2, . . . , z. (27)
It is argued in [21] that if e denote the symbols (in Fq) known to the adversary by observing z shares,
then we have
H(e) ≤ H(r) =M−Ms. (28)
Next, we argue that given the observations of the adversary (cf. (27)) and the secret m, one can decode
the random symbols r, i.e., H(r|m, e) = 0. Note that the secret symbols m correspond to part of
the code symbols cz+1, . . . , cz+t. As highlighted in (25), the secret symbols m are evaluations of the
polynomial F (X,Y ) (cf. (22)). In particular, knowing the secret m translates to knowing d + t − z
evaluations of each of the polynomials in {hj(Y ) = F (xj , Y )}j=z+1,...,z+t and d− z evaluations of each
of the polynomials in {gj(X) = F (X, yj)}j=z+1,...,z+t (cf. (25)). Now, using the observations of the
adversary (cf. (27)), we can obtain z additional observations of each of the polynomials {hj(Y ) =
9Knowing a polynomial means that the adversary knows the coefficients of the polynomials and can evaluate the polynomial
at any point in Fq
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F (xj , Y ), gj(X) = F (X, yj)}j=z+1,...,z+t as follows.
hj(yjs) = F (xj , yjs) = gjs(xj) for j ∈ {z + 1, . . . , z + t} and s ∈ {1, . . . , z} (29)
and
gj(xjs) = F (xjs , yj) = hjs(yj) for j ∈ {z + 1, . . . , z + t} and s ∈ {1, . . . , z}. (30)
Therefore, given the observations of the adversary and the secret symbols one has access to k = z + t
code symbols cj1 , . . . , cjs , cz+1, . . . , cz+t of the associated codeword in C. Now one can use a decoding
algorithm of C to decode Af and subsequently obtain f . Note that the random symbols r can now be
obtained as these symbols constitute M−Ms coordinates of the vector f .
From the two observations shown above that H(e) ≤ H(r) and H(r|e,m) = 0, it follows that the
adversary does not get any information about the secret m from the z shares it has access to [19], [10].
• Communication efficiency: Note that the secret m can be obtained by repairing t code symbols
cz+1, cz+2, . . . , cz+t in the associated codeword c ∈ C. Since C is an MBMR code, this repair process
can be performed by contacting a set of d shares say c˜i1 , c˜i2 , . . . , c˜id and downloading total
γt =
M2dt
(z + t)(2d− z) =
d
d− zM
s
symbols (over Fq) from the d shares we contact (cf. 24). Comparing γt to the lower bound on (19)
establishes the communication efficiency of the secret sharing scheme based on the MBMR code from
[28].
Remark 9. Since the secret sharing scheme C˜ is obtained by puncturing t code symbols in the MBMR
code C. Assuming that the original MBMR code has d ≤ N − t = n − 2t, we can repair any t shares in a
bandwidth efficient manner by invoking the repair mechanism of the MBMR code C. This repair process
would involve contacting any set of d out of remaining N − t shares and downloading γt = M2dt(z+t)(2d−z)
symbols (over Fq) from the contacted shares.
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Appendix A
Zigzag codes: simultaneous repair of up to 3 failed systematic nodes
A. Description of the zigzag construction [3]
Let Zr denote the set {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}. Let e1, e2, . . . , em ∈ Zmr denote the m standard m-dimensional
unit vectors. For i ∈ [m], the vector ei has all but one of its coordinates as zero. The vector ei has value
1 at its i-th coordinate. We use e0 ∈ Zmr to denote an m-dimensional all zero vector. For an integer in
[0, rm− 1] we associate a unique vector from Zmr as its vector representation. Given (m+ 1)rm information
symbols, encoding of an (n = m+ 1 + r, k = m+ 1) zigzag code works as follows.
• Arrange the (m+ 1)rm information symbols in an rm× (m+ 1) array. For j ∈ [m] and i ∈ [rm− 1], let
xi,j denote the (i+ 1)-th information symbol in the (j + 1)-th column of the array. The k = (m + 1)
columns of the information array represent the k systematic nodes in the zigzag code construction.
• In order to generate r parity nodes, for every l ∈ [0, r− 1] and s ∈ [0, rm − 1], we define the zigzag set
Z ls = {xi,j : i+ lej = s}. (31)
Note that we use the vector representations of i, s ∈ [0, rm− 1] while defining the set Z ls in (31). Given
the zigzag set Z ls, (s + 1)-th symbol stored on the (l + 1)-th parity node is linear combination of the
information symbols in the zigzag set Z ls. The coefficients of the linear combinations belong to non-zero
elements (multiplicative group) of a large enough finite field.
1) Repair of a single systematic node in zigzag codes [3]: Here, we briefly describe the repair mechanism
of a single systematic node in the zigzag code construction. For j ∈ [1,m] and l ∈ [0, r − 1], we define the
set
X lj = {i ∈ [0, rm − 1] : i · ej = r − l}. (32)
Again, we use the vector representation of the integer j ∈ [0, rm − 1] while defining the set X lj in (32). For
j = 0 and l ∈ [0, r − 1], we define the corresponding set X l0 as follows.
X l0 = {i ∈ [0, rm − 1] : i · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = l}. (33)
For j ∈ [0,m], those informations symbols stored on the (j+1)-th systematic node which are indexed by the
set X lj are recovered by downloading the code symbols from the (l+ 1)-th partiy node. From the remaining
k − 1 = m systematic nodes, we download those symbols which appear in the symbols downloaded from
the parity nodes. Combining the definitions in (31), (32) and (33), we obtain the following.
Proposition 7. For l ∈ [0, r − 1], let D1l be the set defined as follows.
D1l = {i ∈ [0, rk−1 − 1] : i · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = l}. (34)
Furthermore, for j ∈ [1, k − 1] and l ∈ [0, r − 1], we define the set Dj+1l as follows.
Dj+1l = {i ∈ [0, rk−1 − 1] : i · ej = 0 (mod r)}. (35)
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Then, for j ∈ [0, k− 1] and l ∈ [0, r− 1], the set Dj+1l denotes the indices of the parity symbols downloaded
from (l+ 1)-th parity node in order to repair the (j+ 1)-th systematic node in the event of a single failure.
2) Structure of symbols downloaded to repair different node in the even of a single node failure: In our
approach to repair t simultaneous node failures, we contact the remaining d = n − t nodes and download
symbols in two stages. In the first stage, for each of the failed t node, we download those αn−k = r
k−2
symbols from the contacted node which would have been downloaded to repair this node in the event of
single node failure. Since some of the symbols from a helper node contribute to the repair of many nodes
during the repair of a single node failure, we end up downloading less than tαn−k symbols from each of the
d = n − k contacted node. Using the structure of the zigzag code, in the second stage, we then download
additional symbols from the helper nodes so that each helper node contributes exactly tαn−k symbols. In
order to identify which symbols need to be downloaded in the second stage we need to understand the
structure of the parity symbols downloaded in the first stage. Therefore, we first explore this.
For the ease of exposition, without loss of generality, we assume that the first t systematic nodes are in
failure, i.e., the systematic nodes indexed by the set [t] := {0, 1, . . . , t− 1} experience failure. The analysis
for other t systematic nodes can be carried out in a similar manner. Recall that for j ∈ [0, t − 1] and
l ∈ [0, r − 1], Dj+1l denotes the indices of the parity symbols downloaded from (l + 1)-th parity node to
repair the (j+1)-th systematic node failure. The sets
{Dj+1l }j∈[0,t−1], l∈[0,r−1] are defined in Proposition 7.
It follows from the definition of these sets, that for any set of u out t failed nodes, say indexed by the set
{j1, j2, . . . , ju} ⊆ [0, t− 1], and l ∈ [0, r − 1], we have the following.⋂
j∈{j1,j2,...,ju}
Dj+1l = rk−1−u. (36)
Given this observations, we now define the following families of sets. For {j1, j2, . . . , ju} ⊆ [0, t − 1] and
l ∈ [0, r− 1], we define the set U{j1+1,j2+1,...,ju+1}l to be the indices of the pairty symbols downloaded from
the (l+ 1)-th parity node which participate in the repair of exactly u ≤ t systematic nodes indexed by the
set {j1, . . . , ju} in the event of single node failure. In particular, given S ⊆ [t] and l ∈ [0, r − 1],we have
USl =
⋂
j∈S
Djl \
⋃
S(S′⊆[t−1]
⋂
j∈S′
Djl . (37)
Combining (37) with the definitions of the sets {Dj+1l }j∈[0,k−1],l∈[0,r−1], we obtain that
1) Case 1: 1 ∈ S,
USl = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l; i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S\{1}; and i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [t]\S} ⊆ [0, rk−1 − 1].
(38)
2) Case 2: 1 ∈ [t]\S,
USl = {i : i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S; i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= l; and i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [2, t]\S} ⊆ [0, rk−1 − 1].
(39)
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Moreover, we have that
|USl | = |
⋂
j∈S
Djl | − |
⋃
S(S′⊆[t]
⋂
j∈S′
Djl |
(a)
= rk−1−|S|
(
1− 1
r
)t−|S|
, (40)
where (a) follows from (38) and (39). Note that, by construction, for a fixed l ∈ [0, r − 1], the family of
sets
{USl }S⊆[0,t−1] comprises disjoint sets. In case of t = 3, for a fixed value of l ∈ [0 : r − 1], this gives us
the following sequences of disjoint sets, U{1}l ,U{2}l ,U{3}l ,U{1,2}l ,U{2,3}l ,U{1,3}l ,U{1,2,3}l . Here, for j ∈ [0, 2],
U{j+1}l denotes the indices of those symbols from the (l + 1)-th parity node which participate only in the
repair of (j + 1)-th systematic node in the event of single node failure. The sets U (1,2)l represent the sets of
symbols from (l+ 1)-th parity node that participate only in the repair of 1st and 2nd systematic nodes in
the event of single node failure. Similarly, the parity symbols from (l+ 1)th parity nodes that enable repair
of each of the first 3 systematic nodes in the event of a single node failure are represented by U (1,2,3)l .
We now characterize the sets of information symbols on the lost (failed) systematic nodes that participate
in the sets {USl }S⊆[t],l∈[0,r−1]. For a given j ∈ [0, k − 1], l ∈ [0, r − 1], and S ⊆ [t], let USj→l denotes the
indices of the symbols from the (j + 1)-th systematic node which participate in the parity symbols in the
set USl . Using (31) and (38), we can explicitly characterize these sets. In particular, we consider 3 different
case.
1) Case 1 (a) : j = 0 and 1 ∈ S,
USj→l
(a)
=
{
i ∈ [0, r − 1]k−1 : i ∈ USl
}
(b)
= {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l; i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S\{1}; and i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [t]\S} ⊆ [0, rk−1 − 1].
(41)
2) Case 1 (b) : j = 0 and 1 ∈ [t]\S,
USj→l = {i : i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S; i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= l; and i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [2, t]\S} ⊆ [0, rk−1 − 1].
(42)
3) Case 2 (a) : j 6= 0 and {1, j + 1} ⊆ S,
USj→l
(a)
=
{
i ∈ [0, r − 1]k−1 : i+ lej ∈ USl
}
(b)
=
{
i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0; i · ej + l = 0; i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S\{1, j + 1}; and
i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [t]\S
} ⊆ [0, r − 1]k−1. (43)
4) Case 2 (b) : j 6= 0, 1 ∈ S and j + 1 ∈ [t]\S,
USj→l=
{
i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0; i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S\{1}; i · ej + l 6= 0 and
i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [t]\{S ∪ {j + 1}}
} ⊆ [0, r − 1]k−1. (44)
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5) Case 2 (c): j 6= 0, 1 ∈ [t]\S and j + 1 ∈ S,
USj→l=
{
i : i · ej + l = 0; i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S\{j + 1}; i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0; and
i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [2, t]\S
} ⊆ [0, r − 1]k−1. (45)
6) Case 2 (d): j 6= 0 and {1, j + 1} ∈ [t]\S,
USj→l=
{
i : i · ew−1 = 0 ∀w ∈ S; i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0; i · ej + l 6= 0; and
i · ev−1 6= 0 ∀ v ∈ [2, t]\{S ∪ {j + 1}}
} ⊆ [0, r − 1]k−1. (46)
B. Repairing t = 2 failed nodes
1) First stage of the download process: In the first stage, we download the symbols which enable the
repair of 1st and 2nd systematic nodes in the event of single node failure. In particular, for l ∈ [0, r − 1],
we download the parity symbols indexed by the set
D1l ∪ D2l = U{1}l ∪ U{2}l ∪ U{1,2}l
from the (l+ 1)-th parity node. From the remaining k− 2 systematic nodes, we download those systematic
symbols which appear in these parity nodes.
Sets l = 0 l = 1 · · · l = r − 1
U{1}l U{1}0→0,U{1}1→0 =

U{1,2}1→1
U{1,2}1→2
...
U{1,2}1→r−1

U{1}0→1,U{1}1→1 =

U{1,2}1→0
U{1,2}1→2
...
U{1,2}1→r−1

· · · U{1}0→r−1,U{1}1→r−1 =

U{1,2}1→0
U{1,2}1→1
...
U{1,2}1→r−2

U{2}l U{2}0→0 =

U{1,2}0→1
U{1,2}0→2
...
U{1,2}0→r−1

,U{2}1→0 U{2}0→1 =

U{1,2}0→0
U{1,2}0→2
...
U{1,2}0→r−1

,U{2}1→1 · · · U{2}0→r−1 =

U{1,2}0→0
U{1,2}0→1
...
U{1,2}0→r−2

,U{2}1→r−1
U{1,2}l U{1,2}0→0 ,U{1,2}1→0 U{1,2}0→1 ,U{1,2}1→1 · · · U{1,2}0→r−1,U{1,2}1→r−1
TABLE I: Composition of parity symbols downloaded in the first stage of the repair process to repair of 1st
and 2nd systematic nodes. Blue color symbols correspond to the matched symbols from the 1st systematic
node. Red color symbols represent the matched symbols from the 2nd system node.
We next illustrate a strategy to match the symbols from the failed systematic nodes using the downloaded
symbols illustrated in Table I. Formally, we have the following.
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• Matching symbols from the 2nd systematic node using parity symbols
{U{1,2}l }: We use the symbols
for the (l + 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{1,2}l to match those symbols from the
2nd systematic node that are indexed by the set
U{1,2}1→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0, i · e1 = r − l}.
• Matching symbols from the 1st systematic node using parity symbols
{U{1}l }: We use the symbols
for the (l + 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{1}l to match those symbols from the 1st
systematic node that are indexed by the set
U{1}0→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l, i · e1 6= 0}.
• Matching symbols from the 1st and the 2nd systematic node using parity symbols
{U{2}l }: We use
the symbols for the (l + 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{1}l to match those symbols
from the 1st systematic node that are indexed by the set
U{1,2}0→l+1 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 1, i · e1 = 0}. (47)
We use the remaining | U{2}1→l | − | U{1,2}0→(l+1) |= (rk−2 − 2rk−3)) parity symbols to match the symbols
from the 2nd systematic node with the following indices.
{i : i · (1, . . . , 1) /∈ {0, 1}, i · e1 = r − l} ⊆ U{2}1→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0, i · e1 = r − l}. (48)
As it is clear from Table I and the matching processing described above, the following number of symbols
from the 2 failed nodes are matched by the parity symbols downloaded in the first stage.
1) Number of symbols matched from 1st systematic node (blue colored):
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1}0→l∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,2}0→l+1∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{2}l
= r · (rk−2 − rk−3)+ r · rk−3 = rk−1 = α. (49)
2) Number of symbols matched from 2nd systematic node (red colored):
r−1∑
l=0
(∣∣∣U{2}1→l|∣∣∣− ∣∣∣U{1,2}0→l+1∣∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{2}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,2}1→l ∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1,2}l
= r · (rk−2 − 2rk−3)+ r · rk−3 = rk−1 − rk−2 = α− rk−2.
(50)
2) Second Stage of download process:
• Unmatched symbols from the second systematic node : It follows from (50) that it remains to match
rk−2 symbols from the 2nd systematic node. This requires us to download additional symbols from the
intact nodes. Towards this, let’s consider the unmatched symbols from the second systematic node in
the (l + 1)-th parity node (cf. Table I). These are exactly those symbols among the symbols indexed
by the set U{2}1→l which form linear combinations with the symbols indexed by the set U{1,2}0→l+1. It can
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be easily deduced from (48) that the unmatched symbols from the second systematic node have the
following indices.
R1→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = r − l} (51)
Another way to see this is as follows. Using (41), we know that
U{1,2}0→l+1 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 1, i · e1 = 0}. (52)
Utilizing the definition of the zigzag set (cf. (31)), the symbols from the first systematic nodes which
are indexed by the set U{1,2}0→l+1 appear in those parity symbols in the (l + 1)-th parity node which are
indexed by the set
{i : i ∈ U{1,2}0→l+1} ⊆ [0 : rk − 1]. (53)
We again utilize the definition of the zigzag sets (cf. (31)) to identify the symbols from the second
systematic node that appear in those parity symbols from the (l+ 1)-th parity node which are indexed
by the set defined in (53). These are exactly the symbols indexed by the following set.
R1→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) + l = l + 1, i · e1 + l = 0}
= {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = r − l} (54)
• Additional symbols downloaded to match remaining symbols from the second systematic node : Now,
let’s consider an integer i∗ ∈ [0, rm − 1] = [0, rk−1 − 1] such that the following two conditions hold.
1) i∗ · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1. Note that we are using vector representation of i∗ in Zk−1r = Zmr in defining
this relationship.
2) i∗ · e1 = r − 1, i.e., the first coordinate of the vector representation of i∗ takes the nonzero value
r − 1.
For j ∈ [2, k − 1], the set of additional symbols downloaded from the (j + 1)-th systematic node have
their row indices belonging to the following set.
S{1,2} = {i∗ + a1(e3 − e2) + a2(e4 − e2) + · · ·+ ak−3(ek−1 − e2) : (a1, . . . , ak−3) ∈ [r − 1]k−3}. (55)
Note that we have |S{1,2}| = rk−3. The reason behind this particular choice for the set S{1,2} will
become clear very soon. Now, let’s focus on the additional code symbols that need to be downloaded
from the parity nodes. For l ∈ [0 : r− 1], we download those parity symbols from the (l+ 1)-th parity
node which involve the information symbols associated with the set S{1,2}. Recall that one can use
the definitions of the zigzag sets (cf. (31)) to identify these additional parity symbols that need to be
downloaded. In particular, for l = 0, the additional symbols downloaded from the 1st parity node have
their row indices belonging to the set
P{1,2}0 = S{1,2}. (56)
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In general, for l ∈ [0, r− 1], the additional parity symbols downloaded from the (l+ 1)-th parity nodes
have their row indices belonging to the following sets
P{1,2}l = S{1,2} + l · e2 = S{1,2} + l · e3 = · · · = S{1,2} + l · ek−1. (57)
Now, let’s make sure if these additional parity symbols indexed by the sets {P{1,2}l }l∈[0:r−1] indeed
help us match the unmatched symbols from the second systematic node. Let’s first consider the parity
symbols indexed by the set P{1,2}0 . The symbols from the second systematic node which can be mathced
using these parity symbols are the ones indexed by the set P{1,2}0 = S{1,2} ⊂ [0 : r − 1]k itself, i.e.,
{i : i · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = r − 1}. (58)
Note that these are exactly those symbol which remained unmatched as they appear together those
symbols from the first systematic nodes that are indexed by the set U{1,2}0→2 in the 2nd parity node, i.e.,
the symbols from the second systematic node which are indexed by the set R1→1 (cf. 54). Similarly, one
can show that the symbols from the second systematic node which can potentially be matched using
the additional symbols downloaded from the (l+ 1)-th parity node, i.e., the parity symbols indexed by
the set P{1,2}l , are associated with the set.{
i : i+ le1 ∈ P{1,2}l
}
= {i : i · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = r − (l + 1)}. (59)
Note that these are exactly those symbol denoted by the set R1→l+1. That is, the symbols from second
systematic node which remained unmatched as they appear together those symbols from the first
systematic nodes that are indexed by the set U{1,2}0→l+2 in the (l + 2)-th parity node.
C. Repairing t = 3 failed nodes
1) First stage of the download process: In the first stage, we download the symbols which enable the
repair of the first 3 systematic nodes in the event of single node failure. In particular, for l ∈ [0, r − 1], we
download the parity symbols indexed by the set
D1l ∪ D2l ∪ D3l = U{1}l ∪ U{2}l ∪ U{3}l ∪ U{1,2}l ∪ U{2,3}l ∪ U{1,3}l ∪ U{1,2,3}l
from the (l+ 1)-th parity node. From the remaining k− 2 systematic nodes, we download those systematic
symbols which appear in these parity nodes.
• Matching symbols from first and second systematic node using parity symbols
{U{1,2,3}l }: We use the
symbols for the (l + 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{1,2,3}l to match those symbols
from the third systematic node that are indexed by the set
U{1,2,3}2→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 = r − l}.
• Matching symbols from first and second systematic node using parity symbols
{U{1,3}l }: We propose
the following matching scheme for the symbols from the first and the second systematic node. Given
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Sets l = 0 l = 1 · · · l = r − 1
U{1}
l
U{1}0→0,

U{1,2}1→1
U{1,2}1→2
U{1,2}1→3
.
.
.
U{1,2}
1→r−1

,

U{1,3}2→1
U{1,3}2→2
U{1,3}2→3
.
.
.
U{1,3}
2→r−1

U{1}0→1,

U{1,2}1→0
U{1,2}1→2
U{1,2}1→3
.
.
.
U{1,2}
1→r−1

,

U{1,3}2→0
U{1,3}2→2
U{1,3}2→3
.
.
.
U{1,3}
2→r−1

· · · U{1}
0→r−1,

U{1,2}1→0
U{1,2}1→1
U{1,2}1→2
.
.
.
U{1,2}
1→r−2

,

U{1,3}2→0
U{1,3}2→1
U{1,3}2→2
.
.
.
U{1,3}
2→r−2

U{2}
l

U{1,2}0→1
U{1,2}0→2
U{1,2}0→2
.
.
.
U{1,2}
0→r−1

,U{2}1→0,

U{2,3}2→1
U{2,3}2→2
U{2,3}2→3
.
.
.
U{2,3}
2→r−1


U{1,2}0→0
U{1,2}0→2
U{1,2}0→3
.
.
.
U{1,2}
0→r−1

,U{2}1→1,

U{2,3}2→0
U{2,3}2→2
U{2,3}2→3
.
.
.
U{2,3}
2→r−1

· · ·

U{1,2}0→0
U{1,2}0→1
U{1,2}0→2
.
.
.
U{1,2}
0→r−2

,U{2}
1→r−1,

U{2,3}2→0
U{2,3}2→1
U{2,3}2→2
.
.
.
U{2,3}
2→r−2

U{3}
l

U{1,3}0→1
U{1,3}0→2
U{1,3}0→3
U{1,3}0→4
.
.
.
U{1,3}
0→r−1

,

U{2,3}1→1
U{2,3}1→2
U{2,3}1→3
U{2,3}1→4
.
.
.
U{2,3}
1→r−1

,U{3}2→0

U{1,3}0→0
U{1,3}0→2
U{1,3}0→3
U{1,3}0→4
.
.
.
U{1,3}
0→r−1

,

U{2,3}1→0
U{2,3}1→2
U{2,3}1→3
U{2,3}1→4
.
.
.
U{2,3}
1→r−1

,U{2}2→1 · · ·

U{1,3}0→0
U{1,3}0→1
U{1,3}0→2
U{1,3}0→3
.
.
.
U{1,3}
0→r−2

,

U{2,3}1→0
U{2,3}1→1
U{2,3}1→2
U{2,3}1→3
.
.
.
U{2,3}
1→r−2

,U{2}
2→r−1
U{1,2}
l
U{1,2}0→0 ,U
{1,2}
1→0 ,

U{1,2,3}2→1
U{1,2,3}2→2
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
2→r−1

U{1,2}0→1 ,U
{1,2}
1→1 ,

U{1,2,3}2→0
U{1,2,3}2→2
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
2→r−1

· · · U{1,2}
0→r−1,U
{1,2}
1→r−1,

U{1,2,3}2→0
U{1,2,3}2→1
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
2→r−2

U{2,3}
l

U{1,2,3}0→1
U{1,2,3}0→2
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
0→r−1

,U{2,3}1→0 ,U
{2,3}
2→0

U{1,2,3}0→0
U{1,2,3}0→2
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
0→r−1

,U{2,3}1→1 ,U
{2,3}
2→1 · · ·

U{1,2,3}0→0
U{1,2,3}0→1
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
0→r−2

,U{2,3}
1→r−1,U
{2,3}
2→r−1
U{1,3}
l
U{1,3}0→0 ,

U{1,2,3}1→1
U{1,2,3}1→2
U{1,2,3}1→3
U{1,2,3}1→4
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
1→r−1

,U{1,3}2→0 U
{1,3}
0→1 ,

U{1,2,3}1→0
U{1,2,3}1→2
U{1,2,3}1→3
U{1,2,3}1→4
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
1→r−1

,U{1,3}2→1 · · · U
{1,3}
0→r−1,

U{1,2,3}1→0
U{1,2,3}1→1
U{1,2,3}1→2
U{1,2,3}1→3
.
.
.
U{1,2,3}
1→r−2

,U{1,3}
2→r−1
U{1,2,3}
l
U{1,2,3}0→0 ,U
{1,2,3}
1→0 ,U
{1,2,3}
2→0 U
{1,2,3}
0→1 ,U
{1,2,3}
1→1 ,U
{1,2,3}
2→1 · · · U
{1,2,3}
0→r−1,U
{1,2,3}
1→r−1,U
{1,2,3}
2→r−1
TABLE II: Composition of parity symbols downloaded during repair of t = 3 node failures. Blue colored
symbols correspond to the matched symbols from the 1st systematic node. Red colored symbols represent
the matched symbols from the 2nd system node. Green colored symbols are used to denote the matched
symbols from the 3rd systematic node.
the parity symbols from the (l + 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{1,3}l , we use them
to match those symbols from the second systematic node which are indexed by the set
U{1,2,3}1→l+3 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0, i · e1 = r − (l + 3), i · e2 = 0}. (60)
This would allow us to use the remaining | U{1,3}l | − | U{1,2,3}1→l+3 |= (r − 2)rk−4 parity symbols indexed
by the set U{1,3}l to match those symbols from the second systematic node which are indexed by the
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following set.
{i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l, i · e1 /∈ {0, r − 3}, i · e2 = 0} ⊂ U{1,3}0→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l, i · e1 6= 0, i · e2 = 0}.
(61)
• Matching symbols from first and third systematic node using parity symbols
{U{2,3}l }: We propose the
following matching scheme for the symbols from the first and the second systematic node. Given the
parity symbols from the (l + 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{2,3}l , we use them to
match those symbols from the first systematic node which are indexed by the set
U{1,2,3}0→l+1 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 1, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 = 0}. (62)
This would allow us to use the remaining | U{2,3}l | − | U{1,2,3}0→l+1 |= (r − 2)rk−4 parity symbols indexed
by the set U{2,3}l to match those symbols from the third systematic node which are indexed by the
following set.
{i : i · (1, . . . , 1) /∈ {0, 1}, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 = r − 2} ⊂ U{2,3}2→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 = 0}.
(63)
• Matching symbols from second systematic node using parity symbols
{U{1,2}l }: Given the parity symbols
from the (l+1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{1,2}l , we use them to match those symbols
from the second systematic node which are indexed by the set
U{1,2}1→l = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0, i · e1 = r − l, i · e2 = 0}. (64)
• Matching symbols from first and third systematic node using parity symbols
{U{1}l }: We utilize the
parity symbols from the (l + 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set {Uc{1}l to match the
symbols from the third systematic node with the following indices.
U{1,3}2→l+1 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0, i · e1 6= 0, i · e2 = r − (l + 1)}. (65)
The remaining | U{1}l | − | U{1,3}2→l+1 |= rk−4(r− 1)2 − rk−4(r− 1) unused parity symbols indexed by the
set U{1}l are used to match the symbols from the first systematic appearing in those parity symbols.
• Matching symbols from first and third systematic node using parity symbols
{U{2}l }: Using the parity
symbols from the (l+ 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{2}l , we match the symbols from
the first systematic node with the following indices.
U{1,2}0→l+2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 2, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 6= 0}. (66)
(67)
In addition, we also use these parity symbols to match the symbols from the third systematic node
with the following indices.
Û{2,3}2→l+2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 = r − (l + 2)} ⊂ U{2,3}2→l+2. (68)
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This leaves us with | U{2}l | − | U{1,2}0→l+2 | − | Û{2,3}2→l+2 |= rk−4(r− 1)2− rk−4(r− 1)− rk−4 unused parity
symbols, which we use to match the symbols from the second systematic node appearing in those parity
symbols.
• Matching symbols from first and third systematic node using parity symbols
{U{3}l }: Using the parity
symbols from the (l+ 1)-th parity node which are indexed by the set U{3}l , we match the symbols from
the second systematic node with the following indices.
U{2,3}1→l+2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0, i · e1 = r − (l + 2), i · e2 = 0}. (69)
In addition, we also use these parity symbols to match the symbols from the first systematic node with
the following indices.
Û{1,3}0→l+3{i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 3, i · e1 = r − 3, i · e2 = 0} ⊂ U{1,3}0→l+3. (70)
We utilize the remaining | U{3}l | − | U{2,3}1→l+2 | − | Û{1,3}0→l+3 |= rk−4(r − 1)2 − rk−4(r − 1)− rk−4 unused
parity symbols, which we use to match the symbols from the second systematic node appearing in
those parity symbols.
This concludes the first stage of the downloading process and we have utilized all the parity symbols
downloaded in the first stage to match certain systematic symbols corresponding to the three failed nodes.
We now move to the second stage of the download process where we download additional symbols in order
to match the remaining unmatched symbols associated with the three failed systematic nodes. We illustrate
our strategy to match the symbols from the failed systematic nodes using the downloaded symbols during
the first stage in Table II. Let’s count the number of symbols from different failed systematic nodes that
are matched according to Table II.
1) Symbols from 1st systematic node (blue colored):
r−1∑
l=0
(∣∣∣U{1,3}0→l ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣U{1,2,3}1→l+3 ∣∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1,3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,2,3}0→l+1 ∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{2,3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣Û{1,3}0→l+3∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,2}0→l+2∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{2}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
(∣∣∣U{1}0→l∣∣∣− ∣∣∣U{1,3}2→l+1∣∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1}l
=
(
rk−2 − rk−3 − rk−3)+ rk−3 + rk−3 + (rk−2 − rk−3)+ (rk−1 − 2rk−2 + rk−3 − (rk−2 − rk−3))
= rk−1 − (rk−2 − rk−3). (71)
2) Symbols from 2nd systematic node (red colored):
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,2,3}1→l+3 ∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1,3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,2}1→l ∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1,2}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{2,3}1→l+2∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
(∣∣∣U{2}1→l∣∣∣− ∣∣∣U{1,2}0→l+2∣∣∣− ∣∣∣Û{2,3}1→l+2∣∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{2}l
= rk−3 +
(
rk−2 − rk−3)+ (rk−2 − rk−3))+ ((rk−1 − 2rk−2 + rk−3)− (rk−2 − rk−3)− rk−3)
= rk−1 − rk−2. (72)
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3) Symbols from 3rd systematic node (green colored):
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,2,3}2→l ∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1,2,3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
(∣∣∣U{2,3}2→l ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣U{1,2,3}0→l+1 ∣∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{2,3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
(∣∣∣U{3}2→l∣∣∣− ∣∣∣Û{1,3}0→l+3∣∣∣− ∣∣∣U{2,3}1→l+2∣∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{3}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣U{1,3}2→l+1∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{1}l
+
r−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣Û{2,3}1→l+2∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
from U{2}l
= rk−3 +
(
(rk−2 − rk−3)− rk−3)+(
(rk−1 − 2rk−2 + rk−3)− rk−3 − (rk−2 − rk−3))+ (rk−2 − rk−3)+ rk−3
= rk−1 − rk−2. (73)
2) Second Stage of download process: First, let’s identify the unmatched systematic symbols at the end
of the first stage of the downloading process.
• Unmatched symbols from the first systematic node: The symbols from the second systematic node that
are matched using the parity symbols from the (l + 1)-th parity node are indexed by the set
U{1,3}2→l+1 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 0, i · e1 6= 0, i · e2 = r − (l + 1)}. (74)
Using (31), we can identify the indices of the partiy symbols from the (l+ 1)-parity node where these
symbols participate is as follows.
Z{1,3}l,(2→l+1) = U{1,3}2→l+1 + le2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l, i · e1 6= 0, i · e2 = r − 1}. (75)
The symbols from the first systematic node which remain unmatched at the end of first stage (and
require downloading additional symbols) due to their participation in the parity symbols indexed by
the set Z{1,3}l,(2→l+1) in the (l + 1)-th parity node are as follows.
R0→l = {i : i ∈ Z{1,3}l,(2→l+1)} = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l, i · e1 6= 0, i · e2 = r − 1}. (76)
• Unmatched symbols from the second systematic node: The symbols from the first systematic node that
are (potentially) matched using the parity symbols downloaded from the (l+ 1)-th parity node during
the first stage are indexed by the following two sets.
U{1,2}0→l+2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 2, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 6= 0}. (77)
U˜{2,3}2→l+2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 = r − (l + 2)} ⊂ U{2,3}2→l+2. (78)
Using (31), we can identify the indices of the partiy symbols from the (l+ 1)-parity node where these
symbols participate as follows.
Z{1,2}l,(0→l+2) = U{1,2}0→l+2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 2, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 6= 0}. (79)
Z˜{2,3}l,(2→l+2) = U˜{2,3}2→l+2 + le2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 1, i · e1 = 0, i · e2 = r − 2}. (80)
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The symbols from the second systematic node which remain unmatched at the end of first stage (and
require downloading additional symbols) due to their participation in the parity symbols indexed by
the set Z{1,2}l,(0→l+2) ∪ Z˜{2,3}l,(2→l+2) in the (l + 1)-th parity node are as follows.
R1→l = {i : i+ le1 ∈ Z{1,2}l,(0→l+2)} = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 2, i · e1 = r − l, i · e2 6= 0}. (81)
R˜1→l = {i : i+ le1 ∈ Z˜{2,3}l,(2→l+2)} = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = r − l, i · e2 = r − 2}. (82)
• Unmatched symbols from the third systematic node: The symbols from the second systematic node
that are (potentially) matched using the parity symbols downloaded from the (l + 1)-th parity node
during the first stage are indexed by the following two sets.
U{2,3}1→l+2 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0, i · e1 = r − (l + 2), i · e2 = 0}. (83)
U˜{1,3}0→l+3 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 3, i · e1 = r − 3, i · e2 = 0} ⊂ U{1,3}0→l+3. (84)
(85)
Using (31), we can identify the indices of the partiy symbols from the (l+ 1)-parity node where these
symbols participate as follows.
Z{2,3}l,(1→l+2) = U{2,3}1→l+2 + le1 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= l, i · e1 = r − 2, i · e2 = 0}. (86)
Z˜{1,3}l,(0→l+3) = U˜{1,3}0→l+3 = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 3, i · e1 = r − 3, i · e2 = 0}. (87)
The symbols from the third systematic node which remain unmatched at the end of first stage (and
require downloading additional symbols) due to their participation in the parity symbols indexed by
the set Z{2,3}l,(1→l+2) ∪ Z˜{1,3}l,(0→l+3) in the (l + 1)-th parity node are as follows.
R2→l = {i : i+ le2 ∈ Z{2,3}l,(1→l+2)} = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0, i · e1 = r − 2, i · e2 = r − l}. (88)
R˜2→l = {i : i+ le2 ∈ Z˜{1,3}l,(0→l+3)} = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 3, i · e1 = r − 3, i · e2 = r − l} (89)
We now describe the set of additional symbols downloaded to match the unmatched symbols from the
three failed systematic nodes (cf. (76), (81) and (88)).
• Additional symbols downloaded to match remaining symbols from the first systematic node: Consider
a set of r− 1 integers I0 = {i0,1, . . . , i0,r−1} ⊂ [0, rk−1− 1] such that the following two conditions hold.
1) i0,j · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1 ∀ j ∈ [r − 1].
2) i0,j · e1 = j for j ∈ [r − 1].
3) i0,j · e2 = r − 1 ∀ j ∈ [r − 1].
Note that we are using vector representation of the integers from the I0 in Zk−1r in order to define
these three requirements. For j ∈ [3, k−1], the set of additional symbols downloaded from the (j+1)-th
systematic node in order to match the remaining symbols from the first systematic node have their
row indices belonging to the following set.
S{1,2,3}0 = I0 + {a1(e4 − e3) + · · ·+ ak−4(ek−1 − e3) : (a1, . . . , ak−4) ∈ [r − 1]k−4}. (90)
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Note that we have |S{1,2,3}0 | = (r − 1)rk−4. Next, we identify the set of the parity symbols in the
(l + 1)-th parity nodes where these symbols appear. Let P{1,2,3}0,l denote the indices of these parity
symbols in the (l+ 1)-th parity node. Then, from the definition of the zigzeg sets (cf. 31), we have that
P{1,2,3}0,l = S{1,2,3}0 + le3 = S{1,2,3}0 + le4 = · · · = S{1,2,3}0 + lek−1
= {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 1, i · e1 6= 0, i · e2 = r − 1}. (91)
We can again use (31) to indentify the symbols from the second systematic node that appear in the
parity symbols from l + 1-th parity symbols that are indexed by the set P{1,2,3}0,l .
{i : i ∈ P{1,2,3}0,l } = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 1, i · e1 6= 0, i · e2 = r − 1}. (92)
Note that this is exactly equal to R0→l+1 which is the indices of the unmatched symbols from the first
systematic as they appeared in the parity symbols downloaded from the (l+ 1)-th parity node during
the first stage.
• Additional symbols downloaded to match remaining symbols from the second systematic node:
1) Consider a set of r − 1 integers I1 = {i1,1, . . . , i1,r−1} ⊂ [0, rk−1 − 1] such that the following two
conditions hold.
a) i1,j · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 2 ∀ j ∈ [r − 1].
b) i1,j · e1 = r − 1 ∀ j ∈ [r − 1].
c) i1,j · e2 = j for j ∈ [r − 1].
Note that we are using vector representation of the integers from the I1 in Zk−1r in order to define
these three requirements. For j ∈ [3, k − 1], the set of additional symbols downloaded from the
(j + 1)-th systematic node in order to match the remaining symbols from the second systematic
node have their row indices belonging to the following set.
S{1,2,3}1 = I1 + {a1(e4 − e3) + · · ·+ ak−4(ek−1 − e3) : (a1, . . . , ak−4) ∈ [r − 1]k−4}. (93)
Note that we have |S{1,2,3}1 | = (r− 1)rk−4. Next, we identify the set of the parity symbols in the
(l+ 1)-th parity nodes where these symbols appear. Let P{1,2,3}1,l denote the indices of these parity
symbols in the (l+1)-th parity node. Then, from the definition of the zigzeg sets (cf. 31), we have
that
P{1,2,3}1,l = S{1,2,3}1 + le3 = S{1,2,3}1 + le4 = · · · = S{1,2,3}1 + lek−1
= {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 2, i · e1 = r − 1, i · e2 6= 0}. (94)
We can again use (31) to indentify the symbols from the second systematic node that appear in
the parity symbols from l + 1-th parity symbols that are indexed by the set P{1,2,3}1,l .
{i : i+ le1 ∈ P{1,2,3}1,l } = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 2, i · e1 = r − (l + 1), i · e2 6= 0}. (95)
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Note that this is exactly equal to R1→l+1 which is the indices of the unmatched symbols from the
second systematic as they appeared in the parity symbols downloaded from the (l + 1)-th parity
node during the first stage.
2) Consider an integers i˜1 ∈ [0, rk−1 − 1] such that the following two conditions hold.
a) i˜1 · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1.
b) i˜1 · e1 = r − 1.
c) i˜1 · e2 = r − 2.
For j ∈ [3, k− 1], we download additional symbols from the (j + 1)-th systematic node with their
row indices belonging to the following set.
S˜{1,2,3}1 = i˜1 + {a1(e4 − e3) + · · ·+ ak−4(ek−1 − e3) : (a1, . . . , ak−4) ∈ [r − 1]k−4}. (96)
Note that we have |S˜{1,2,3}1 | = rk−4. Next, we identify the set of the parity symbols in the (l+1)-th
parity nodes where these symbols appear. Let P˜{1,2,3}1,l denote the indices of these parity symbols
in the (l + 1)-th parity node. Then, from the definition of the zigzeg sets (cf. 31), we have that
P˜{1,2,3}1,l = S˜{1,2,3}1 + le3 = S˜{1,2,3}1 + le4 = · · · = S˜{1,2,3}1 + lek−1
= {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 1, i · e1 = r − 1, i · e2 = r − 2}. (97)
We can again use (31) to indentify the symbols from the second systematic node that appear in
the parity symbols from l + 1-th parity symbols that are indexed by the set P˜{1,2,3}1,l .
{i : i+ le1 ∈ P˜{1,2,3}1,l } = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 1, i · e1 = r − (l + 1), i · e2 = r − 2}. (98)
Note that this is exactly equal to the unmatched symbols from the second systematic node denoted
by R˜1→l+1 (cf. (82)).
• Additional symbols downloaded to match remaining symbols from the third systematic node:
1) Consider a set of r − 1 integers I2 = {i2,1, . . . , i2,r−1} ⊂ [0, rk−1 − 1] such that the following two
conditions hold.
a) i2,j · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = j for j ∈ [r − 1].
b) i2,j · e1 = r − 2 ∀ j ∈ [r − 1].
c) i2,j · e2 = r − 2 ∀ j ∈ [r − 1].
Note that we are using vector representation of the integers from the I2 in Zk−1r in order to define
these three requirements. For j ∈ [3, k − 1], the set of additional symbols downloaded from the
(j + 1)-th systematic node in order to match the remaining symbols from the third systematic
node have their row indices belonging to the following set.
S{1,2,3}2 = I2 + {a1(e4 − e3) + · · ·+ ak−4(ek−1 − e3) : (a1, . . . , ak−4) ∈ [r − 1]k−4}. (99)
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Note that we have |S{1,2,3}2 | = (r− 1)rk−4. Next, we identify the set of the parity symbols in the
(l+ 1)-th parity nodes where these symbols appear. Let P{1,2,3}2,l denote the indices of these parity
symbols in the (l+1)-th parity node. Then, from the definition of the zigzeg sets (cf. 31), we have
that
P{1,2,3}2,l = S{1,2,3}2 + le3 = S{1,2,3}2 + le4 = · · · = S{1,2,3}2 + lek−1
= {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= l, i · e1 = r − 2, i · e2 = r − 2}. (100)
We can again use (31) to indentify the symbols from the third systematic node that appear in
the parity symbols from (l + 1)-th parity symbols that are indexed by the set P{1,2,3}2,l .
{i : i+ le2 ∈ P{1,2,3}2,l } = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) 6= 0, i · e1 = r − 2, i · e2 = r − (l + 2)}. (101)
Note that this is exactly equal to R2→l+2 which is the indices of the unmatched symbols from
the third systematic node as they appeared in the parity symbols downloaded from the (l+ 1)-th
parity node during the first stage.
2) Consider an integers i˜2 ∈ [0, rk−1 − 1] such that the following two conditions hold.
a) i˜2 · (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 3.
b) i˜2 · e1 = r − 3.
c) i˜2 · e2 = r − 1.
For j ∈ [3, k− 1], we download additional symbols from the (j + 1)-th systematic node with their
row indices belonging to the following set.
S˜{1,2,3}2 = i˜2 + {a1(e4 − e3) + · · ·+ ak−4(ek−1 − e3) (mod r) : (a1, . . . , ak−4) ∈ [r − 1]k−4}.
(102)
Note that we have |S˜{1,2,3}2 | = rk−4. Next, we identify the set of the parity symbols in the (l+1)-th
parity nodes where these symbols appear. Let P˜{1,2,3}2,l denote the indices of these parity symbols
in the (l + 1)-th parity node. Then, from the definition of the zigzag sets (cf. 31), we have that
P˜{1,2,3}2,l = S˜{1,2,3}2 + le3 = S˜{1,2,3}2 + le4 = · · · = S˜{1,2,3}2 + lek−1
= {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = l + 3, i · e1 = r − 3, i · e2 = r − 1}. (103)
We can again use (31) to indentify the symbols from the third systematic node that appear in
the parity symbols from l + 1-th parity symbols that are indexed by the set P˜{1,2,3}2,l .
{i : i+ le2 ∈ P˜{1,2,3}2,l } = {i : i · (1, . . . , 1) = 3, i · e1 = r − 3, i · e2 = r − (l + 1)}. (104)
Note that this is exactly equal to the unmatched symbols from the third systematic node denoted
by R˜2→l+1 (cf. (89)).
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